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Abstract
Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the
(subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such
committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present
a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish
verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal pre-
meeting; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the pre-
meeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse
what the e¤ect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally,
we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of
the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the
publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings.
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1 Introduction
Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the
working of a representative democracy. One reason is that transparency facilitates
democratic accountability. Another reason is that when representatives make de-
cisions behind closed doors, the citizens may suspect that their interests are not
fully promoted. Why else the secrecy? Against the background of the potential
advantages of transparency, it is hardly surprising that legislation, like the Freedom
of Information Act in the United States, tries to foster transparency. More gener-
ally, "over thirty countries have passed Open Government codes, which establish
the principle that a citizen should be able to access any public document" (Prat,
2005, p.2). However, it is not always clear that this type of legislation succeeds
in safeguarding transparency. Stiglitz (1998) was shocked by the focus on secrecy
in the Clinton administration when he served as the chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers. Debate in parliaments is another point in case. Typically, de-
bate in Parliament is formally open. In the Netherlands, however, many decisions
are actually "pre-cooked" behind closed doors. Before elections, Dutch politicians
promise to debate in the open. However, once an administration has been installed,
the old habit of bargaining in pre-meetings is continued.
One of the objectives of this paper is to explain why - as Stiglitz (1998, p.17)
puts it - "there remains an obsession with secrecy despite Americas social consensus
in favor of openness". Our paper consists of a theoretical part and an empirical
part. In the theoretical part, we develop a framework in order to study the e¤ects of
transparency on group decision-making. This framework describes a situation where
on behalf of the public a three-person committee has to make a binary decision,
deciding for change or maintaining the status quo. Initially, all members are skeptic
about change. Each committee member then forms a private view on the proper
decision. Before the committee takes a decision, its members can exchange views.
In this paper, a transparent decision-making process means that the public observes
this exchange of views as the result of, say, the presence of cameras or the publication
of verbatim transcripts. A closed decision-making process, by contrast, means that
the public does not observe the exchange of views. A crucial feature of our model
is that the committee members are concerned about how the public perceives their
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decision-making abilities. As in Visser and Swank (forthcoming), such reputational
concerns give incentives to the committee members to conceal disagreement from
the public. Obviously, in a closed decision-making process, disagreement can be
concealed. Once the decision has been made, the committee members form a united
front. They will claim their privately held views coincided, and that all therefore
favoured the same decision. Moreover, we show that in a closed decision-making
process, reputational concerns may induce committee members to distort decisions.
The reason is that three skeptics maintaining the status quo may stem from all
holding negative private views, but also from conicting opinions. If three skeptics
put aside their doubts and decide for a change, this must mean their privately held
views were all favourable. As concurring views signal competence, reputational
concerns make deciding for change more attractive. This result of our analysis
suggests that citizens should indeed be suspicious of decision-making in secrecy.
In a situation where the decision-making process is transparent, the committee
members cannot forge a united front. Possible disagreement shows up when private
views are exchanged. The implication is that the committee does not speak with one
voice and that there are no incentives to distort the decision. However, transparency
does not remove reputational concerns. It is still in members interests to hide
disagreement. We show that transparency induces them to organize a pre-meeting.
We call a formal meeting preceded by a pre-meeting an opendecision-making
process. By a pre-meeting, we mean a meeting without cameras and of which no
minutes are kept, and that can be used, therefore, to freely exchange views. Lunches
and dinners before o¢ cial meetings are examples, but also a quick exchange in a
colleagues o¢ ce before entering the o¢ cial, transcribed, meeting. Such informal
gatherings can be used to collect all opinions, and to determine what decision is
best. Once this has been determined, the members can again show a united front
in the formal meeting. If all members participate in the pre-meeting, then an open
process is equivalent to a closed process. As above, the committee will speak with
one voice, and the decision may be distorted. Imposing transparency, then, does
not improve accountability nor the quality of decision-making. However, in case not
all members participate in the pre-meeting, decisions may be pre-cookedwith less
information. As a result, from a social point of view, transparency with concomitant
pre-meetings is typically inferior to a closed decision-making process. Accountability
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increases as one obtains a clearer idea of the views held by di¤erent groups (those
who did and those who did not participate in a pre-meeting).
One problem with a theory on closed versus open decision-making processes is
that it is hard to test. By denition, in closed meetings and in pre-meetings much
information on the way decisions are reached remains hidden. However, Meade and
Stasavage (2004) point to an interesting exception. Before 1993, meetings of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) were closed. More precisely, members
of the FOMC were unaware that these meetings were tape-recorded and that the
tapes were kept. So, before 1993, FOMC members believed that their meetings were
closed. Starting in the fall of 1992, the FOMC came under pressure of Congress to
become more transparent. In particular, Congress requested it to provide a detailed
account of the discussion taken place. After strong opposition, the FOMC decided to
release lightly-edited, but otherwise verbatim transcripts of the meetings with a ve
year delay. Moreover, transcripts of meetings before 1993 were made available. This
decision can be regarded as a (small) step towards a transparent decision-making
process.
Recently, Meade (2005) has developed a unique data set of the 72 FOMC meet-
ings during the period 1989-1997. This set contains codes of voiced preferences and
formal votes of individual FOMC members. Against the background of our theoret-
ical model, this data set is especially interesting, because it covers the years before
and after the regime shift of 1993. In the second part of our paper, we use Meades
data set, in addition to anecdotal evidence, to assess whether some of the main
predictions of our model make sense. The overall conclusion is that our predictions
are broadly consistent with the facts. In particular, the step towards a transparent
decision-making process seems to have shifted part of the deliberations from the
formal meetings to pre-meetings.
Our paper contributes to a small but growing literature on transparency. Prat
(2005) denes transparency as the ability of a principal to observe the agents behav-
ior and its consequences.1 Using a model of career concerns (see Holmström 1999),
1On the basis of the principals information, we can distinguish at least ve types of transparen-
cies: (1) information about actions; (2) information about consequences of actions; (3) information
about voting records (Gersbach and Hahn, 2003); (4) information about the deliberation stage;
and (5) the statement after a meeting (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005). This paper focuses on
type (4).
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Prat shows that the principal always benets from observing the consequences of
an agents action, but she may su¤er from observing the agents action itself. The
reason for this result is that when the action is observed, reputational concerns may
induce the agent to ignore private information and to behave as an able agent is
expected to behave. Our paper di¤ers from Prats in that we focus on a group,
rather than on a single agent. Moreover, in our model, the principal does observe
the decision taken by the group, but does not always observe how this decision is
arrived at.
Stasavage (2005b) also examines whether there are arguments against trans-
parency. He analyzes a model in which committee members are representatives,
who are concerned about their reputation for being unbiased relative to their prin-
cipals. He shows that a transparent decision-making process may prompt agents to
posture by proposing policies that are most preferred by their principals.
Levy (2004) analyzes the way in which transparency of the decision making
process in committees a¤ects decisions. As in our paper, committee members are
concerned about their reputations for being capable. In a closed meeting, the public
evaluates membersabilities on the basis of the nal decision. In Levy, commit-
tee members know their own abilities. Low ability members want to conceal their
abilities. They can do so by voting for the option that requires little consensus.
An important di¤erence between Levys model and ours is that in her model each
committee member is responsible for evaluating a decision on a di¤erent dimension.
In our model, committee members have a common expertise. As mentioned earlier,
one implication of this feature of our model is that committee members want to
conceal disagreement.
The paper by Meade and Stasavage (2004) is most closely related to our paper.
Like us, they focus on a committee whose members want to convince the public
that they are able decision-makers. Moreover, as in our paper transparency relates
to the deliberation stage in the decision making process. Finally, they also present
empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that more transparency after 1993
has a¤ected deliberations in the FOMC. An important di¤erence with our paper is
that committee members in Meade and Stasavage (2004) speak in a sequence. As
a result, reputational concerns may lead to herding as in, for example, Scharfstein
and Stein (1990) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001). By contrast, we assume that
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committee membersstatements are prepared in advance, so that committee mem-
bers de facto speak simultaneously. In addition, our paper deviates from Meade and
Stasavage, and all the other papers discussed above, in its focus on pre-meetings.
As far as we know, we are the rst who explore the idea that transparency may give
incentives to agents to organize pre-meetings.
More generally, our paper belongs to the far more extensive literature on commit-
tees (see Gerling et al., 2005, for a recent survey). This literature deals with topics
like the optimal size of a committee (see, for example, Mukhopadhaya, 2003, and
Persico, 2000), the optimal voting rule in a committee (see for example, Feddersen
and Pesendorfer, 1998, and Ladha, 1992), and communication among committee
members (see, for example, Austen-Smith, 1990, Coughlan, 2000, and Meirowitz,
2004 and 2005). In this paper, we assume a given size of the committee. Moreover,
we avoid problems of imperfect communication by assuming committee members to
be homogeneous. This assumption ensures that members do not have incentives to
fool each other (see Li et al, 2001, and Visser and Swank, forthcoming).
Our paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the model. The
analysis is presented in Sections 3-6. Section 7 elaborates on the empirical relevance
of our analysis. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
As we apply our model to the FOMC in Section 7, we phrase our model in terms of
monetary policy. However, the model can be applied to a host of committees.
On behalf of the public, a three-person committee has to decide between main-
taining the status quo, X = 0, and adjusting the funds rate, X = 1. By normal-
ization, status quo delivers a payo¤ equal to zero. If the funds rate is adjusted, the
expected payo¤ to each member (and the public) equals p + . The parameter p
is the ex ante expected payo¤ from a funds rate adjustment. The stochastic term
 captures that the state of the economy, and therefore the e¤ect of the rate ad-
justment, is uncertain. We assume that  2 f u; ug, with equal prior probability.
Moreover, we assume that (i) p < 0, implying that the committee has a bias against
adjusting the funds rate; (ii) p+ u > 0, implying that the socially optimal decision
depends on the state of the economy.
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At the beginning of the game, each member i 2 f1; 2; 3g possesses a private signal
about , si 2

sb; sg
	
. A signal refers to a members assessment of  (b is bad and g
is good). Whether this signal is informative depends on a members type, ti. Each
member can be smart or dumb, ti 2 fsm; dug. The prior probability that a member
is smart equals . A smart member has a fully informative signal about . His view
on  is awless, Pr ( = u j sg; sm) = Pr   =  u j sb; sm = 1. A dumb member
receives an uninformative signal: Pr ( = u j sg; du) = Pr   = u j sb; du = 1
2
. He
does not learn anything new about the expected value of the rate change. A member
does not know his own competence, only the probability with which he is smart, .2
The ex ante probabilities of , and the prior probability  are common knowledge.
Preferences over the alternatives consist of two parts, one reecting the public in-
terest, and one reecting reputational concerns. Specically, member is preferences
are represented by:
Ui (X = 1) = p+ + ^i (X = 1; ) (1)
Ui (X = 0) = ^i (X = 0; ) (2)
^i denotes the posterior belief held by the marketor the publicthat a committee
member is smart. We assume that when updating its beliefs, the market does not
observe . The idea is that even ex post it is often hard to evaluate policy decisions.
Most of our results, however, do not hinge on the assumption that  is not observed.
The market does observe the funds rate decision, and, depending on the way the
decision-process is organized, may observe how the funds rate decision is arrived
at. The parameter  measures how much committee members care about their
reputation. Notice that the committee members have homogenous preferences. We
use (1) and (2) with  = 0 to represent the publics interest.
We discuss three decision-making processes. In a closed decision-making process,
the committee publishes a voting record, but does not publish a transcript of the
meeting. Within the committee, the funds rate decision is made in two stages. In the
rst stage, the communication stage, each member sends a message, mi 2

mb;mg
	
.
By this we mean that a member presents an analysis of . In the second stage, the
2"Dumb" may mean "less smart". What matters for the results is that a smart type has a
higher likelihood of correctly assessing the state of the economy than a dumb type.
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voting stage, the messages sent are common knowledge, and the members vote
on the funds rate, vi 2

vb; vg
	
, where vi = vb (vi = vg) denotes that i votes
against (in favour of) a funds rate adjustment. We assume that messages are sent
simultaneously, and that votes are cast simultaneously. The relationship between
the individual votes cast and the decision on the project is determined by the voting
rule. This decision-making process tries to capture the situation at the FOMC before
1993. In a transparent decision-making process, the committee is required to publish
a verbatim transcript of the meeting. The decision process is characterized by the
same communication and voting stages. Finally, an opendecision-making process,
tries to capture the main characteristics of what we believe to be the actual situation
after 1993. The process within the FOMC meeting is as in the second arrangement,
but Governors can decide to organize a pre-meeting, in which they may exchange
their views and may coordinate their statements for the formal meeting.
3 A Closed Decision-Making Process
As there is no conict of interest, members share their information (mi = mx if
si = s
x for x 2 fg; bg), and individual voting strategies coincide (see Coughlan
2000, and Visser and Swank, forthcoming). If member 1 prefers one alternative over
the other, so do members 2 and 3. The voting rule is therefore immaterial. We will
therefore say that the committee votes, rather than a member.
We start the analysis with the derivation of the decision rule that is rst-best
from the publics perspective. Let k denote the number of positive signals received
by the three members, and let E ( j k) denote the expected value of  conditional
on k (out of 3) positive signals. Furthermore, let kFB be such that p + E [jk] > 0
for k  kFB and p+ E [jk] < 0 for k < kFB.
Denition 1. The rst-best decision rule consists of two parts. First, information
is shared. Second, the rate is changed if and only if k  kFB.
To ensure that the committee operates in an interesting environment, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 1: p+ E ( j 3) > 0
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If Assumption 1 were violated, X = 1 would never be in the public interest. The
determination of kFB is a statistical matter. As p < 0, p+ E ( j 1) < 0. Hence, the
optimal decision rule is characterized by either kFB = 2 or kFB = 3. It is easy to
verify that if the absolute value of p is su¢ ciently large, then kFB = 3 . The reason
is that a strong bias against X = 1 should be compensated by much evidence for
 = u. Moreover, if the value of  is relatively small, then kFB = 3. For the moment
we assume that kFB = 3. At the end of this subsection, we will show how kFB = 2
a¤ects the results.
Under which conditions is the rst-best decision rule an equilibrium outcome
of the game? As information is shared in the meeting, and as voting strategies
will coincide, answering this question amounts to establishing the conditions under
which the committee votes for a rate change if and only if k = 3. We rst derive the
posterior beliefs, assuming that the decision on X is made in accordance with the
rst-best decision rule. By assumption, under a closed decision-making process, the
public does not observe how decisions are reached. It only observes the nal decision.
However, knowing that decisions are made in line with the rst-best decision rule,
the public can infer from X = 1 that k = 3, and from X = 0 that k < 3. One can
verify that
^ (X = 1) =
1 + 2 + 2
1 + 32
 >  (3)
^ (X = 0) =
7  2   2
7  32  <  (4)
A rate change commands a higher reputation than maintaining the status quo. The
reason for this result is that an adjustment implies that all committee members hold
the same view about the state of the economy (a favourable view). Maintaining the
status quo may either result from all members holding the same (negative) view, or
from conicting evidence about the state of the economy. As in our model smart
committee members hold identical views, whereas dumb members may di¤er in
opinion, the decision with the higher degree of concurrence of privately held views
gives rise to a higher reputation. Hence, X = 1 signals a higher degree of competence
than X = 0.
As a consequence, committee members who care considerably about their repu-
tations may be willing to accept a rate change if that decision yields a considerable
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boost in reputation, even though su¢ cient evidence showing the adequacy of the
change is lacking. The incentive to do so is strongest in case the number of views
favouring a rate change falls just short of kFB = 3, so for k = 2. Hence, the rst-best
decision rule is an equilibrium outcome if
^ (X = 0)  p+ E [ j 2] + ^ (X = 1) (5)
  c =  
p+ E [ j 2]
^ (X = 1)  ^ (X = 0) (6)
The right-hand side of (6) is positive, because of our assumption that kFB = 3.
Thus, for the rst-best decision rule to be an equilibrium outcome, reputational
concerns should not be too important.
Now suppose that  > c , so that the rst-best decision rule is not part of
an equilibrium. Can it be an equilibrium for the committee to vote for a rate
adjustment with probability one not just if k = kFB = 3, but also if k = 2? Suppose
it can. Then, X = 1 would imply that either the private views of all members
were the same or the private views of just two members would coincide (and be
supportive of a rate change). Similarly, X = 0 would result either from the private
views of all members being the same or from the views of two members coinciding
(and being against a rate change). That is, a rate adjustment would no longer be
concomitant to more signal concurrence than maintaining the status quo, and so
^ (X = 1) = ^ (X = 0) =  would hold. That is, the reputational benets needed
to compensate for the cost of distorting the funds rate decision (rate change even
for k = 2 < kFB) would be absent. The upshot is that if  > , an equilibrium in
which the committee favours a rate adjustment with probability one in case of k = 2
cannot exist. The committee vote will be in mixed strategies. The next proposition
characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Suppose a closed decision procedure. Furthermore suppose that
kFB = 3. Let c satisfy ^ (X = 0; 

c) = p + E [ j 2] + ^ (X = 1; c). If   c,
the committee votes v = vg if k = 3, and v = vb in case k  2. If  > c, the com-
mittee votes v = vg if k = 3; v = vg with probability c, and v = v
b with probability
1  c, if k = 2; v(k) = vb if k  1.
The main message of Proposition 1 is that reputational concerns may distort
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the funds rate decision. Since X = 1 indicates similarity of signals, it improves
the members reputations. By contrast, X = 0 damages members reputations.
Reputational concerns may then induce the committee to favour a rate change too
often.
Apart from the e¤ects of reputational concerns on the funds rate decision, the
model has another important implication. It is in the committee membersinterest
to conceal conicting signals, as divergence of private views would signal lack of
competence.
If a statement concerning the decision is made public after the meeting, it will
provide a summary of the deliberations, containing non-attributed opinions showing
committee-wide support for the decision taken. Schultz, a former Governor and
Vice-Chairman of the FOMC states it succinctly: We should argue in the Board
meetings but close ranks in public(Greider 1988, p. 390).3
So far we have assumed that kFB = 3. Suppose now that kFB = 2. What are
the implications for our results? If kFB = 2, and the decision on X is made in line
with the rst-best decision rule, the degree of signal concurrence is the same for
either decision. There is therefore no reason to deviate from the rst-best decision
rule with a view to improving ones reputation. The desire to hide dissenting views
about the state of the economy remains. Now suppose that kFB = 1, implying that
the committee should choose X = 0 if and only if all members receive a negative
signal.4 Obviously, in that case X = 0 signals that all members have received the
same signal. So, reputational concerns may then induce committee members to
choose X = 0 too often from a social point of view.
4 A Transparent Decision-Making Process
In a fully transparent process, the statements members make during the meeting
become public. The main implication of transparency is that the market will not
base its beliefs about the committee membersabilities on the funds rate decision
anymore. Rather, it will base its beliefs directly on the messages sent. It is an
3In the political science literature, this phenomenon is referred to as the norm of consensus, see
e.g. Epstein, Segal and Spaeth (2001).
4Of course, this requires p > 0.
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equilibrium for all members to share their information. To see why, note that because
all members are smart with a positive probability, the signals are correlated: if
si = s
x, then it is more likely that any other member has received the same signal
sx than the opposite one. It is then best from a reputational perspective to share
ones information. Given the transparency, once information has been shared, the
committee members can no longer inuence the reputation they command by the
decision onX. Hence, the committee members have no incentive anymore to deviate
from the rst-best decision rule. They therefore vote favourably only if k  kFB.
As in case of a closed decision-making process, the voting rule is immaterial.
Proposition 2 Suppose committee decision-making is transparent. Then, in equi-
librium the committee implements the rst-best decision rule.
Proposition 2 suggests that transparency is in the publics interest. It seems
to serve the twin goals of improving accountability and policy decisions. However,
a caveat is in order. Transparency may hurt the committee members since the
public becomes aware of disagreement in the committee. The relevant posteriors for
member 1 become
^1 (s1 = s2 = s3) =
1 + 2 + 2
1 + 32
 >  (7)
^1 (s1 = s2 6= s3) = ^1 (s1 = s3 6= s2) =  (8)
^1 (s1 6= s2 = s3) = 1  
1 + 
 < , (9)
where we have written the posteriors as functions of the signals, as signals are
observed by the public. This shows that the worst situation for member 1 is that
he turns out to be an outlier (see 9). Clearly, this gives incentives to committee
members to discover ways of concealing disagreements. This is the topic of the next
section.
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5 An OpenDecision-Making Process
5.1 The Desire to Organize a Pre-meeting
In this section, we make a distinction between two kinds of committee members.
Member i 2 f1; 2g is called a Governor, and member i = 3 is called a President. At
zero costs, the Governors can organize a pre-meeting in which they share information
and coordinate the statements to be made in the formal meeting. If Governors share
information and s1 6= s2, they can decide to feign in the formal meeting that both
have received sb or sg. We assume that Governors stick to what they decide in the
pre-meeting discussion. In this way, the Governors can conceal possible disagreement
between them. We make this distinction between Governors and President because
it seems to be an important feature of the reality at the FOMC to be discussed in the
next section. We do not want to describe the distinction as an equilibrium outcome
of our model. We would argue that in the present model di¤erences in, say, weights
attached to reputation would not be a plausible explanation for the presence of all
Governors at the pre-meeting and the absence of all Presidents from it. We think
it is more plausible that the determining factor is the concentration of Governors in
Washington, and the Presidentsdispersion across the USA.
If the public thinks the decision-making process is transparent, then the ex
post reputations are given by (7)-(9). Then, deviating from a transparent decision-
making process by organizing a pre-meeting never hurts a Governors expected rep-
utation, and it may actually improve. If s1 = s2, organizing a pre-meeting does not
hurt a Governors reputation; if s1 6= s2, organizing a pre-meeting improves the ex-
pected reputation. Of course, if their privately held views coincide, they will jointly
report that view in the formal meeting. What to report, however, in case of con-
icting opinions? Given (7)-(9), from a reputational perspective, the Governors are
indi¤erent between jointly favouring a rate change and jointly favouring the status
quo in the public meeting.5 Suppose that kFB = 3. Then a conict of opinion among
Governors is su¢ cient evidence that it would be best not to change the funds rate,
irrespective of the Presidents information. Therefore, in case of s1 6= s2, Governors
will jointly favour the status quo in the formal meeting. Let mx12 denote that the
5This is so because Pr (sg3js1 6= s2) = Pr
 
sb3js1 6= s2

= 12 .
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Governors state mx, x 2 fg; bg in the formal meeting.
Proposition 3 Suppose a transparent decision-making process, and kFB = 3. The
Governors have an incentive to organize a pre-meeting in which they share their
information and tune their messages, m12 = mb12 in case of s1 6= s2.
What if instead kFB = 2? A conict of opinion between Governors is insu¢ cient
evidence for a decision on the interest rate. The Presidents information is decisive.
However, for given voting behaviour in the transparent meeting, if the Governors
tune their messages in the pre-meeting, the decision on X is actually made by the
Governors. The President does not play a role anymore. As a result, when kFB = 2
the cost of organizing a pre-meeting is that the Presidents signal is not utilized.
For instance, suppose that the Governors decide to organize a pre-meeting and to
state mg12 if s1 6= s2. Then, in case s1 6= s2, and s3 = sb, the funds rate is adjusted,
although an adjustment yields a negative payo¤, p+E [j1] < p < 0. Likewise, when
the Governors decide to organize a pre-meeting and to state mb12 if s1 6= s2, then in
case s1 6= s2, and s3 = sg, the status quo is maintained while the funds rate should
be adjusted, p + E [j2] > 0. Thus, a pre-meeting gives rise to a distortion. As the
reputational gains are the same, but the costs of stating mb12 are smaller than those
of mg12 (jp+ E [j2]j < jp+ E [j1]j), the Governors are more tempted to support the
status quo in the formal meeting.
Proposition 4 Suppose a transparent decision-making process, and kFB = 2. De-
ne
T :=
p+ E [j2]
^1 (s1 = s2 = s3)  ^1 (s1 6= s2 = s3) (10)
If   T , the Governors have no incentive to organize a pre-meeting. If  > T ,
they do have such an incentive. Then, m12 = mb12 in case of s1 6= s2.
The main result of this sub-section is that, in general, Governors have an incen-
tive to gather before the formal meeting to avoid the embarrassment of dissensus
becoming public. The only reason they do not enter a pre-meeting discussion in
case of  < T and kFB = 2 is the absence of the President. Of course, had the
President been able to join, Governors and President would have met before the
formal meeting.
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5.2 Behaviour in an opendecision-making process
Now suppose that the Governors have organized a pre-meeting in which they share
information. What does behaviour in the pre-meeting and subsequently in the formal
meeting look like? It will be useful to discuss the case where kFB = 3 rst.
5.2.1 kFB = 3
Let km be the number of messages mg in the formal meeting. Let m3 = mx3 ,
x 2 fg; bg, denote the Presidents statement in the formal meeting. Can the following
strategies be part of an equilibrium? In the pre-meeting, Governors decide to state
in the formal meeting mx12 if s1 = s2 = s
x, and mb12 if s1 6= s2. The President
shares his information in the o¢ cial meeting, m3 = mx3 if s3 = s
x. Voting strategies
coincide, and the voting rule is immaterial. The committee votes v = vg if km = 3,
and v = vb otherwise. To show that this can be an equilibrium, we rst derive the
posterior beliefs corresponding to these strategies:
^1 (m
g
12;m
g
3) =
1 + 2 + 2
1 + 32
 >  (11)
^1
 
mg12;m
b
3

=  (12)
^1
 
mb12;m
g
3

=
3 + 
3 + 3
 <  (13)
^1
 
mb12;m
b
3

=
3 + 2
3 + 32   23 <  (14)
From these posterior believes it immediately follows that mg12 is better for member
1s expected reputation thanmb12. Of course, the reason is that the market takes into
account that in case of conicting signals, both Governors express negative opinions
in the formal meeting. Accordingly, mg12 indicates agreement in privately held views.
The Governors may therefore be tempted to state mg12 in case of conicting signals.
In the event that s3 = s
g
3, this would lead to a distorted decision on the funds rate.
They can resist the temptation, and state mb12 rather than m
g
12 in case of s1 6= s2,
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if6
1
2
[^1
 
mb12;m
g
3

+ ^1
 
mb12;m
b
3

]
 1
2
(p+ E [ j 2]) + 1
2
[^1 (m
g
12;m
g
3) + ^1
 
mg12;m
b
3

] (15)
implying
  pm =  
p+ E [ j 2]
^1 (m
g
12;m
g
3) + ^1
 
mg12;m
b
3
   ^1  mb12;mg3+ ^1  mb12;mb3 (16)
If   pm, then the governors are not willing to distort the rate decision in order
to improve their reputations.
Given the imputed equilibrium behaviour, the voting strategy of the committee is
optimal. Once the statements have been made in the formal meeting, the reputations
are xed. The voting strategy then maximizes the project value given the statements
made.
Finally, we show that the President shares his information. In the imputed
equilibrium the ex ante expected reputation of a President, conditional on a signal
s3 = s
x, equals . This is so because a signal in isolation contains no information
about the Presidents competence. That is,
Pr (mg12jsg3) ^3 (mg12;mg3) + Pr
 
mb12jsg3

^3
 
mb12;m
g
3

=  (17)
Pr
 
mb12jsb3

^3
 
mb12;m
b
3

+ Pr
 
mg12jsb3

^3
 
mg12;m
b
3

=  (18)
Here, ^3 (m
g
12;m
g
3) >  > ^3
 
mb12;m
g
3

, and ^3
 
mb12;m
b
3

>  > ^3
 
mg12;m
b
3

as
concurrence in statements given in the formal meeting is a stronger sign of compe-
tence than di¤erences in publicly stated opinions. Now suppose the President were
to overstate the merits of the rate change, by stating mg3 if s
b
3. This would decrease
the likelihood attached to the higher reputation in (17), and increase the likelihood
attached to the lower reputation in (17). The result would be an expected reputation
smaller than . The President, then, wants to honestly report sb3. A similar type of
reasoning shows that the President does not want to understate sg3 by claiming m
b
3.
Now suppose  > pm. Assume voting strategies are as before. Because  > 

pm,
6Note that Pr (sg3js1 6= s2) = 1=2.
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the Governors are now willing to distort the rate change decision to strengthen
their expected reputation. However, stating mg12 with probability one in case of
s1 6= s2 cannot be part of an equilibrium. If the Governors were to do this, mb12
would indicate concurrence of signals, and would therefore boost the Governors
reputations. Instead of an equilibrium in pure strategies, an equilibrium in mixed
strategies exists. Let pm = Pr (m12 = m
g
12js1 6= s2) denote the probability that
the Governors express positive statements in case of conicting opinions. In such
an equilibrium, given posterior beliefs and s1 6= s2, the Governors are indi¤erent
between stating mb12 and stating m
g
12. That is, 

pm satises
1
2
[^1
 
mb12;m
g
3; 

pm

+ ^1
 
mb12;m
b
3; 

pm

] (19)
=
1
2
 
p+ E [ j 2] + ^1
 
mg12;m
g
3; 

pm

+
1
2
^1
 
mg12;m
b
3; 

pm

We have 0 < pm <
1
2
, as a rate change should remain the decision commanding the
higher reputation to compensate for the distortion.
What has to be checked is whether the assumed voting strategies are best replies.
In particular, what should be checked is that if mg12 and m
g
3, the President is willing
to vote favourably. It is optimal for the Governors to vote favourably if and only if
km = 3. For the behaviour of the President, the voting rule matters. If a majority
is su¢ cient for a rate change, the voting behaviour of the President is immaterial.
If instead unanimity is required, the President should also cast a favourable vote
for the rate change to take place. Once statements have been made in the formal
meeting, reputations are set. The President will cast a favourable vote if and only
if
p+ E

jmg12;mg3; pm

> 0, (20)
where we have added pm to indicate that the expected value depends on the state-
ment strategy of the Governors. Notice that this restriction is stronger than As-
sumption 1.
Finally, the analysis showing that the President shares his private information in
the formal meeting in case of   pm carries over to the  > pm case. The above
discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose kFB = 3.
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(a) If   pm, Governors share their information in the pre-meeting. (i) If s1 =
s2 = s
x, then m12 = mx12, and if s1 6= s2, then m12 = mb12; (ii) If s3 = sx, then
m3 = m
x
3, for x 2 fg; bg; (iii) The voting rule is immaterial. If km = 3, then v = vg;
and v = vb otherwise.
(b) If  > pm, and (20) holds, the voting rule is immaterial. If (20) does not hold,
suppose the voting rule equals majority. Governors share their information in the
pre-meeting. (i) If s1 = s2 = sx, then m12 = mx12, if s1 6= s2, then m12 = mg12 with
probability pm, and m12 = m
b
12 with probability 1   pm, with pm satisfying (19);
(ii) If s3 = sx, then m3 = mx3 for x 2 fg; bg; (iii) If km = 3, then v = vg , and
v = vb otherwise, for i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
(c) If  > pm, and (20) does not hold, and the voting rule is unanimity, the status
quo will always be maintained.
Proposition 5 states that if reputational concerns are su¢ ciently strong, the funds
rate decision deviates from the rst-best decision. In case of majority voting, the
result will be too frequent an adjustment of the funds rate. If instead unanimity is
required, the nature of the distortion depends on whether the President is convinced
by the arguments put forth by the Governors in the public meeting. If he is, and he
holds a favourable view himself, the committee favours a rate change too often. If
he is not, no rate change takes place at all.
5.2.2 kFB = 2
To derive behaviour in the open decision-making process if kFB = 2, attention
can be limited to the case where  > T (see Proposition 4). We showed that
Governors want to gather before the formal meeting and favour the status quo
in the formal meeting in case of conicting opinions as this causes the smallest
distortion. However, with a rate change commanding a higher expected reputation,
the temptation is again to favour a rate change in case of conicting opinions. For
  pm, the Governors can resist this temptation, where
pm :=  
2p
^1 (m
g
12;m
g
3) + ^1
 
mg12;m
b
3
   ^1  mb12;mg3+ ^1  mb12;mb3 .
and with posterior reputations dened in (11)-(14). For  > pm, Governors will
follow a mixed strategy in case of conicting opinions. The voting rule determines
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whether they can have their way in the formal meeting, or should be able to convince
the President of the quality of their joint assessment. Let pm satisfy
^1
 
mb12;m
g
3; 

pm

+ ^1
 
mb12;m
b
3; 

pm

= 2p+ ^1
 
mg12;m
g
3; 

pm

+ ^1
 
mg12;m
b
3; 

pm

(21)
As before, pm <
1
2
.
Proposition 6 Suppose kFB = 2.
(a) Suppose  2 (T ; pm]. Governors share information in the pre-meeting. (i) If
s1 = s2 = s
x, then m12 = mx12, and if s1 6= s2, then m12 = mb12; (ii) If s3 = sx,
then m3 = mx3, for x 2 fg; bg; (iii) The voting rule is immaterial. If km  2, then
v = vg; and v = vb otherwise.
(b) Suppose  > pm and majority rule. Governors share information in the pre-
meeting. (i) If s1 = s2 = sx, then m12 = mx12, and if s1 6= s2, then m12 = mg12 with
probability pm, and m12 = m
b
12 with probability
 
1  pm

, with pm satisfying (21);
(ii) If s3 = sx, then m3 = mx3, for x 2 fg; bg; (iii) For i 2 f1; 2g, vi = vg if and
only km  2; v3 is immaterial.
(c) Suppose  > pm and unanimity. Behaviour is as described under (b), except
for the Presidents voting strategy: v3 = vg in the following cases (i) (m
g
12;m
g
3); (ii) 
mg12;m
b
3

and p+E

jmg12;mb3; 
  0; (iii)  mb12;mg3 and p+E jmb12;mg3;   0;
otherwise v3 = vb.
As in the case of kFB = 3, the more Governors care about their reputations, the
more often a distortion in the direction of a rate change occurs. With kFB = 2, the
higher is , the more often a distorted rate change results in case of (s1; s2; s3) 2 
sg; sb; sb

;
 
sb; sg; sb
	
. This is due to the fact that a rate change commands a
higher reputation than maintaining the status quo. There is a second distortion
that is not operative in case of kFB = 3. It stems from the fact that conicting
opinions among Governors is no longer indicative as to right rate decision in case of
kFB = 2. However, reputational concerns induce them to jointly favour the status
quo. This causes the committee to stick to the status quo too often. That is, if
(s1; s2; s3) 2
 
sg; sb; sg

;
 
sb; sg; sg
	
, the rate is not changed at all (under (a)), or
only with a probability pm (under (b) and (c)).
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6 Does Transparency Achieve the Intended Goals?
As argued in the introduction, the demand for transparency may arise for at least
two reasons. First, transparency is a necessary condition to hold decision-makers
responsible for the decisions they take. Hence, any information that becomes avail-
able thanks to requiring deliberations to take place in public and that allows one
to better evaluate the quality of individual decision-makers should be valued. Sec-
ondly, transparency is viewed as a means to take away the suspicion that secrecy
induces decision-makers to improve their own lot at the cost of the publics. We
now consider either claim in turn.
Does requiring transparency improve accountability if decisions are made by a
group? We have argued that the pressure to become transparent gives rise to pre-
meeting discussions. If all members participate, the complete discussion that takes
place in a closed meeting moves to the pre-meeting. The transcript of the for-
mal meeting merely shows full support for the decision reached in the pre-meeting.
Accountability is not improved. If, however, only Governors participate in the pre-
meeting, transparency does allow one to learn more about the debate taking place
between Governors on the one hand, and the President on the other before a deci-
sion is reached. As a result, it improves the markets view of the quality of decision-
makers: the number of information sets on which these views can be based increases.
Note that transparency does not lead to pre-meetings in case kFB = 2 and reputa-
tional concerns are small. In this case, transparency allows for full accountability.
Does transparency lead to less distorted policies? A number of considerations
plays a role. For kFB = 2, the quality of decision-making either stays the same or
goes down. In a closed decision-making process the rate change is not distorted as
either decision commands the same reputation. For values of   pm, transparency
requirements do not give rise to a pre-meeting, and therefore no policy distortions
arise. For  > pm, a pre-meeting does take place, and distortions are inevitable.
In case of unanimity, it may actually induce the President to vote for status quo no
matter what.
If instead kFB = 3, a comparison is more complex as now the decision on the
rate change can be distorted in either decision-making process. Both the threshold
value of  that determines whether committee members distort and the number of
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signal sets for which the distortion occurs vary with the decision-making process.
First, the incidence of the distortion. The rate change decision is distorted for more
signal sets in a closed meeting than in an openmeeting. In a closed meeting, the
decision is distorted if two out of three signals are positive. In an open meeting, an
additional condition should hold: one of the two positive signals should be held by
the President. For example, suppose s1 = s2 = sg and s3 = sb, and assume that
 is su¢ ciently high to lead to distorted decisions. Then, in a closed meeting, the
members implement the rate change with probability . A distorted decision results
as k = 2 < kFB = 3. In an open decision-making process, however, the Presidents
negative statement in the o¢ cial meeting leads the committee to maintain the status
quo.
Now consider the threshold value that determines whether the decision is dis-
torted. A comparison of (6) and (16) shows that their numerators have the same
value, but that the value of the denominator in (6) is smaller than the value of
the denominator in (16). As a result, c > 

pm, meaning that Governors in a pre-
meeting distort the decision for lower values of  than when the three committee
members operate in a closed decision-making process. The reason is that the repu-
tational gains compared to the costs of distorting the rate change decision are larger
in case of an open decision-making process than in a closed process. It also follows
that, for given parameter values, pm > 

c . This means that if the signal sets are
such that committee members consider distorting the rate decision, they do so more
frequently in a pre-meeting than in a closed decision-making process.
For kFB = 3, then, there are two opposing forces that determine under which
decision-making process the decision is distorted most: the number of signal sets
is larger in case of a closed decision-making process than in an open process, but
the likelihood with which the rate change is distorted for a given information set is
smaller. For values of  such that pm > 

c  0, the fact that in closed decision-
making process the number of signal sets for which the decision is distorted is higher
than in an open decision-making is less of a concern. So for relatively low values of
, a closed decision-making process gives rise to less costly distortions than an open
decision-making process. For higher values of , the reverse holds. Now c > 0, and
as a consequence the fact that members consider distorting the decision for more
signal sets under a closed decision-making process than under an open decision-
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making process makes the former process perform worse than the latter.
7 The FOMC: A Case Study
Our models generate at least two main predictions. First, reputational concerns
give incentives to committee members to conceal disagreements. Second, making
the debate in meetings more open prompts committee members to organize pre-
meetings. As a consequence, deliberation takes place in informal pre-meetings rather
than in formal meetings. In this section, we examine to what extent the behavior
of members in the FOMC ts our two predictions for the 1989-1997 period.
At the outset, we would like to emphasize that the FOMC case deviates from
our theoretical models in at least two important respects. First, in our model the
committee members are equal. In the FOMC, however, the Chairman is by far and
large the most important member.7 The dominance of Greenspan, for example,
was so strong that it was sometimes di¢ cult to distinguish between the FOMC and
Greenspan.8 In our opinion, this does not mean that reputational concerns have
not played a role under Greenspan. Below, we present anecdotal evidence that it
was Greenspan who strongly pressed for unanimity and consensus. Moreover, it was
Greenspan who often took the initiative for one-to-one pre-meetings. One possible
interpretation of all this is that Greenspan wants "his FOMC" to be considered
an outstanding committee. Second, as mentioned in the introduction, in 1993, the
FOMC decided to release verbatim transcripts of its meetings with a ve year delay.
Clearly, this is only a small step towards opening the deliberation stage in the FOMC
meetings. In our theoretical models, however, the deliberation stage in the formal
meeting is either closed or open. It is therefore quite likely that our theoretical
analysis overestimates the consequences of the regime shift in 1993.
Anecdotal Evidence
Recently, two books by former Fed Governors have been published. Blinder (2004)
7Chappel, McGregor and Vermilyea (2005) assess that under Arthur Burns, the opinion of the
Chairman counted as much as the opinions of the other FOMC members together.
8Blinder (2005, p. 11) mentions the Greenspan Fed as an example for a situation where it is
hard to tell whether a given central bank uses group or individual decisionmaking.
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wrote a book on how central banking has changed over the past 15 years.9 Meyer
(2004) wrote a book in which he provides an insiders view of the Fed. Both books
contain much information relevant for an evaluation of our two main predictions.
Do FOMC members conceal disagreements? Blinder (2004, p. 26) calls the
FOMC "collegial". In such a committee, he argues, "individual members are ex-
pected to fall in line behind the groups decision". The Chairman plays an important
role in building a consensus: "... the desire to maintain the appearance of unity will
sometimes force even a dominant chairman to tack in either the hawkish or dovish
direction in order to keep wavering committee members on board" (Blinder, 2005,
p. 58-59, italics in original). Meyer (2004, p. 52), who never dissented during his
term as a Governor, also mentions a norm of conforming to the majority: "Once
the majority view (...) is apparent at FOMC meetings, the Committee is expected
to rally around it".
Has transparency led to pre-meetings in the FOMC case? A hint to the answer
to this question is Greenspans response to the pressure from Congress that the
FOMC should become more transparent. He argued that in a meeting members
need to feel free to trade ideas, question assumptions, advance hypotheses, make
projections, speculate on alternative policies and possible outcomes, and especially
to change their views in response to the arguments of others. He felt that such
would no longer be possible if Congress had its way. He conjectured that the request
of Congress would induce an important change: [a] tendency would arise for one-
on-one pre-meeting discussions, with public meetings merely announcing already
agreed-upon positions or each participant to enter the meeting with a nal position
not subject to the views of others(Greenspan, as quoted in Meade and Stasavage
2004, pp. 18-19).
Did the pre-meetings actually take place? Meyer (2004, p. 50) leaves no doubt
that they did: "To ensure that he (Greenspan) has the votes to support his policy
recommendation, the Chairman visits with the members of the Board in advance
of FOMC meetings". The nature of the pre-meetings has changed over time: "Af-
ter a while, the Chairman abandoned the private talks before the FOMC meetings
and instead used the Monday Board meeting (the day before the FOMC meeting)
9We also draw on Blinder (2005).
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to share with us his views on the outlook and indicate where he was leaning with
respect to policy. Unlike the FOMC meeting the next day, the discussions at the
Monday Board meeting did not consist of prepackaged presentations. They were a
much truer give-and-take, a serious exchange of ideas, with each of us questioning
one another along the way". In his book, Blinder does not explicitly write about pre-
meetings. However, his remark about the statement that accompanies a monetary
policy decision is enlightening: "Toward the end of Greenspans chairmanship, can-
didate drafts of the statement were vetted by FOMC members prior to the meeting"
(Blinder, 2005, footnote 19). Finally, it is worth mentioning that "Reserve Bank
Presidents are not part of the pre-meeting discussions at the Board (Meyer, 2004,
p. 51).
All in all, there exists anecdotal evidence suggesting that (i) there was a tendency
to conformism in the FOMC; (ii) during Meyers term as a Governor (1996-2002)
pre-meetings were held; (iii) in both (i) and (ii), the Chairman played an essential
role.
Data on Vote Dissents and Voice Dissents
Let us now examine whether our predictions are consistent with the dataset com-
posed by Ellen Meade (2005). This set contains codes of voiced policy preferences
and formal votes of individual FOMC members, drawn from the transcripts and
voting records of the 72 FOMC meetings during the period 1989-1997.10 Following
Meade and Stasavage (2004), to examine the e¤ects of the regime shift in 1993, we
consider two sub-periods, one before 1993 and the other after 1993.11 The dataset
thus covers four years (1989-1992, 32 meetings, see Table 1) in which members were
under the (wrong) impression that their deliberations were secret and four years
(1994-1997, 32 meetings) in which they realized that their remarks would be made
public in the course of time.
Do we observe in this dataset a tendency to conceal disagreement? Table 1 re-
ports 48 vote dissents in 64 meetings.12 This seems to be a small number. More
10The data le is on http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/past/2005/. See Meade
(2005) for a description.
11The observations for 1993 are excluded, because it is hard to determine whether members then
knew that the debate in the FOMC would become public.
12Henry Chappell et al. (2005, p. 11) report that just 7.8 percent of all votes during the
1966-1996 period were dissenting.
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importantly, the number of voice dissenting opinions is higher (75). Thus, when
members of the FOMC verbally dissent from the Charimans proposal, sometimes
they do not subsequently dissent in the o¢ cial vote. This may indicate that com-
mittee members indeed conceal disagreements.
Does the regime shift in 1993 change the nature of the debate in the FOMC
meetings as predicted by our model? Table 1 shows that while dissenting views in the
policy go-around were already infrequent before 1993 (48 on a total of 325 opinions),
they became very rare in later years. This is especially true for the Governors of the
Board, who almost always presented a united front with the Chairman after 1993.
There was also a sharp decrease in the number of members again, Governors in
particular that voiced dissent but supported the Chairmans funds rate proposal
when it came to voting (reported as "Inconsistent voice dissents" in Table 1). So,
we see a convergence of speech and voting behaviour after 1993. This observation is
in line with the anecdotal evidence that after 1993 pre-meetings were held in which
Board members participate.
TABLE 1
Characteristics of FOMC meetings over 1989-1992 and 1994-19971
Number of: 1989-1992 1994-1997 % change
Meetings 32 32 0
Number of voice and votes 325 320 -2
Vote dissents 35 13 -63
of which Governors 16 2 -88
Voice dissents 48 27 -44
of which Governors 17 5 -71
Inconsistent voice dissents2 27 16 -41
of which Governors 9 3 -67
Meetings having three or more voice dissents 9 4 -56
Meetings having three or more vote dissents 4 0 -100
1 Numbers of dissents refer to voting members only. Chappell et al. (2005, p. 111)
nd that "...nonvoting alternates have no appreciable inuence over policy out-
comes".
2 Members who voiced dissent but formally voted in favour of the Chairmans
interest rate proposal.
Possible Caveats
The above ndings are clearly consistent with our theory. We should make sure,
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however, that the di¤erences in voice and vote dissents between the two sub-periods
were not due to di¤erences in the state of the economy. More specically, the decline
in voice and vote dissents through the years may simply reect that monetary policy
was less complicated, less controversial or less special after 1993 than before. This
does not seem to be the case, though. First of all, the funds rate was altered twice
as much after 1993 than before (see Table 2). Perhaps more importantly, the rst
sub-period was one of monetary easing, whereas the second sub-period had seven
rate increases, some of which fell on stony ground with the Clinton administration.13
Table 2 Characteristics of monetary policy over 1989-1992 and 1994-1997
Number of: 1989-1992 1994-1997 % change
Changes in funds rate 5 10 100
of which increases 0 7 -
Policy directive not in line with previous bias 5 8 60
Outliers vis-à-vis range of Taylor rules:1
- various measures of ination 2 3 50
- various measures of the output gap 7 12 71
1 Figures refer to the number of quarters in which the funds rate was outside a
range of various Taylor rules over the respective periods.
A somewhat more sophisticated way of looking at the issue is to examine for
each FOMC meeting whether the decision on rate and bias was in line with the bias
adopted at the previous meeting.14 If not, we regard the economic conditions at
the time of the current meeting as special. This is either a meeting at which an
asymmetric bias adopted at the previous meeting was discontinued without a rate
change, or a meeting at which a rate change was not preceded by an asymmetric
bias. There were eight such meetings in the second sub-period and just ve in the
rst (see second row of Table 2). So, also from this perspective, there is no reason
to assume that monetary policy has become less complicated after 1993.
As a nal test, we have examined in how many quarters the funds rate di¤ered
from what a Taylor rule would prescribe. A Taylor rule explains Fed behaviour (i.e.,
the funds rate) from combinations of observed values of ination and the output
gap.15 Former Fed-economist Sharon Kozicki (1999) considers a number of Taylor
13See, e.g., Woodward (2000, pp. 122-123).
14The bias prepares nancial markets for possible future changes in the funds rate.
15See John Taylor (1993). Although it is somewhat controversial as a beacon for monetary policy
26
rules, each based on di¤erent denitions of ination and the output gap. In Table 2
we report how often the funds rate fell outside the range of rule recommendations one
obtains by varying these denitions. Monetary policy could be called complicated or
special if actual fund rates fall outside this range. Again, it turns out that monetary
policy was not more special before 1993 than after.
The above leads to the conclusion that monetary policy was likely to be more
complicated after 1993 than before 1993. Therefore, the decrease in the number
of voice dissents in FOMC meetings cannot easily be explained by a change in the
economic environment.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the e¤ects of having a committee deliberate in public
or in private. An important feature of our analysis is that committee members are
concerned with the publics perception of their decision-making abilities. We have
shown that (1) reputational concerns give incentives to conceal disagreements; (2)
in a closed decision-making process, committee members may distort decisions in
an attempt to boost their reputations; (3) transparency may shift debate from the
formal meeting to closed, informal meetings; (4) if transparency indeed shifts dis-
cussions, it does not increase welfare; (5) the predictions of our model are consistent
with data and anecdotal evidence on the behavior of members of the FOMC in the
years before and after the FOMC became more open in 1993.
Although we have applied our model to monetary policy, we believe its scope
is much wider. In the introduction we have already mentioned politics. These
days, transparency is especially an important theme in discussions about European
political institutions. Stasavage (2005a) has looked at the e¤ects of attempts to make
the European Council of Ministers more transparent. His ndings are in line with
some of our theoretical results. For example, he observes a tendency to presenting
a united front in the European Council of Ministers despite internal divisions. In
addition, he argues how the Council has used subsidiary committees in order to
prevent disagreements from becoming public. This nding is in the spirit of our
among central bankers, Meyer (2004) nds it . . . a useful set of guidelines for making monetary
policy(p. 44).
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analysis. The warning for backroom discussions or for deals to be done over lunch
when European institutions are required to become more transparent is fully in line
with our ndings.
9 Appendix
Proof of proposition 4: The benets and costs of deviating from a transparent
decision-making process are exclusively determined by the Governorsactions in case
of conicting signals, s1 6= s2. Assume s1 = sg and consider Governor 1. This is
without loss of generality. In a transparent process, his expected payo¤ equals
Pr (sg3js1 6= s2) (p+ E [j2] + ^1 (s1 = s3 6= s2)) +
Pr
 
sb3js1 6= s2

(0 + ^1 (s1 6= s2 = s3))
The payo¤ in the pre-meeting depends on the way the Governors tune signals. First
suppose that m12 = m
g
12 in case of s1 6= s2. Then, deviating from a transparent
process yields Governor 1
Pr (sg3js1 6= s2) (p+ E [j2] + ^1 (s1 = s2 = s3)) +
Pr
 
sb3js1 6= s2

(p+ E [j1] + ^1 (s1 = s2 6= s3))
It then follows that a Governor does not want to deviate from a transparent process
for   t :=   p+E[j1]^1(s1=s2=s3) ^1(s1 6=s2=s3) . If instead m12 = mb12 in case of s1 6= s2,
then deviating yields Governor 1
Pr (sg3js1 6= s2) (0 + ^1 (s1 = s2 6= s3)) +
Pr
 
sb3js1 6= s2

(0 + ^1 (s1 = s2 = s3))
A Governor does not want to deviate if   T := p+E[j2]^1(s1=s2=s3) ^1(s1 6=s2=s3) . Because
jp+ E [j2]j < jp+ E [j1]j (as E [j1] =  E [j2] < 0), T < t, it follows that the
Governors want to deviate from a transparent process if  > T .
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5
given in the text. We will (i) show the relevance of pm; (ii) argue that T > 

pm
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may hold; and (iii) show the relevance of the conditions in (c).
(i) Suppose that behaviour is as described under Proposition 6 (a). Suppose
s1 6= s2. The Governors prefer mb12 rather than mg12 if
Pr (sg3js1 6= s2)

0 + ^1
 
mb12;m
g
3

+ Pr
 
sb3js1 6= s2
 
0 + ^1
 
mb12;m
b
3

 Pr (sg3js1 6= s2) [p+ E [j2] + ^1 (mg12;mg3)]
+Pr
 
sb3js1 6= s2
 
p+ E [j1] + ^1
 
mg12;m
b
3

As E [j1] =  E [j2] < 0, this inequality reduces to   pm.
(ii) For the equilibrium discussed in (a) to exist, T > 

pm must hold. It can
readily be checked that the denominator of T is larger than the denominator of
pm. This inequality may hold as the numerator of T may be smaller or bigger
than than the numerator of pm.
(iii) The President votes favourably in case of (i), (mg12;m
g
3), because the number
of positive signals is at least two. In the remaining two cases, he has to weigh the
possibilities that two signals are positive and that only one is.
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